by Subodh Atal

Foreign policy received insufficient attention in the 2000 presidential election campaign. Few Americans pondered the intricacies of grand strategy. September 11, and the events since, have significantly altered the landscape. Americans are now acutely aware that international affairs, including events in remote corners of the world, cannot be neglected. Many ask whether we are "winning the war on terror," and whether the next administration's foreign policies will minimize the risk of future terror reaching Americaís shores. A significant number of voters are likely to choose the presidential candidate whose foreign policy is better positioned to counter terror.

While a "war on terror" has been waged since late 2001 in response to the attacks on New York and Washington, the results of this action are uneven. A number of senior Al Qaeda operatives have been captured or killed, and the United States has not suffered an attack on its homeland since September 11. On the other hand, as CIA director George Tenet himself said at a Senate hearing, a global movement infected by Al Qaeda's radical agenda now threatens America. Not only are anti-U.S. terrorist networks expanding globally, a large number of threats that had been identified soon after September 11 have yet to be dealt with.

Although the Taliban regime was overthrown and the terrorist camps in Afghanistan destroyed in U.S.-led action starting October 2001, Taliban supporters and other anti-U.S. forces are making a comeback in Afghanistan. The United States fought a war and touched off an insurgency in Iraq based on exaggerated terrorist and WMD threats. During that period, in Pakistan, an international arms trading system--a veritable Wal-Mart for nuclear proliferation--was supplying weapons technology to a number of nations on the international rogues list. Jihadis continue to operate inside Pakistan, and the exposure of its nuclear proliferation network has renewed doubts about whether that nationís nuclear weapons can be kept out of jihadi hands. A very small proportion of global jihad funding has been identified, and there is continued concern that the Saudis have not shut down the funding sources that have long seeded international jihad operations.

Thus, the results derived from the current implementation of the "war on terror" are mixed, at best. Some will say, with good reason, that this war is a long-term undertaking and overnight results should not be expected. But the complexity and magnitude of this war does not explain our spotty efforts to fight it. There is another reason: the "war on terror" is being played out in a larger milieu, one that is defined by a U.S. grand strategy that has attained far more clarity since September 11. This strategy seeks primacy in an ever-expanding number of regions around the globe, and its aims and implementation tactics do not always coincide with those of the "war on terror."

In America's Strategic Choices, a book published over three years before the events of September 11, the authors predicted that a strategy for global domination would lead U.S. policy makers to inflate threats in order to justify questionable interventions abroad. Conversely, the same quest for global primacy also creates "sacred cows," such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the Bush administration's tendency to omit references to misdeeds attributable to the two nations.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, its financial support for jihad continues, but this is often downplayed given its role as a U.S. ally enabling unquestioned American strategic dominance in the Middle East. Similarly, a long-term U.S. strategic hold in South Asia is accorded a higher priority than forcing Gen. Musharraf to shut down the entire terrorist infrastructure for good, and getting Pakistan's nuclear assets out of the reach of jihadis hell-bent on destroying America.

Should the next administration continue on a path towards increasing U.S. primacy in the world, even if it means compromising in the war on terror? Is the quest for global primacy more important than national security, and is such primacy even feasible, given that such a quest has helped push the nation towards destabilizing budget deficits? The 2004 presidential campaign will be a chance for the American electorate to understand and question such vital choices that are being made at the highest levels of strategic policy making.

Subodh Atal is an independent foreign affairs analyst based in Washington, D.C.