The old saying, "Fool me once shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me" comes to mind when reading the assertions that Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons.

The same neoconservative pundits, such as William Kristol who wrote in the January 23rd Weekly Standard , "we support holding open the possibility of, and beginning to prepare for, various forms of military action," and Charles Krauthammer, the Project for a New American Century, and George Will, who were so glaringly wrong about Iraq and its supposed WMD programs, are now making menacing statements about Iran.

But contrary to much of the media reporting, Iran is far from being able to build nuclear weapons. Consider, for example, a report "Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant," released Jan. 12 by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a non-profit group in Washington, D.C. It looked at Iran's plans to enrich uranium, an activity that Iran had suspended but recently announced it would resume by completing work on its centrifuge uranium enrichment program.

The report noted several technical problems Iran would face in making just one facility, at Natanz, operational. Barring any major problems, Iran would need half a year to a year just to demonstrate successful operation there. The report noted that, without major modification, this facility is unlikely to be used to make significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.

The ISIS report, in a worst case assessment, noted that Iran might have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. It also noted that there were those in the U.S. intelligence community, hardly apologists for Iran, who believe that a date of 2009 is overly optimistic.

Currently, Iran only has a single almost-ready reactor, at Bushehr. No other reactors are yet being built, and the fuel-fabrication plant will not be fully up and running until 2012.

Nevertheless, despite the extensive post mortems that have been done on the inadequacy of United States and other countries intelligence on Iraq, the Bush administration seems determined to repeat its errors by relying on the same discredited playbook. Thus, we see familiar ploys such as the touting of statements from disenchanted exiles with obvious agendas, like the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

The problem with much of this new rhetoric is that it lacks substance. The United States, and for that matter, Israel, do not have good military options.

A study released last year by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies institute noted, "As for eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities militarily, the United States and Israel lack sufficient targeting intelligence to do this..." Compounding these difficulties is what Iran might do in response to such an attack.

After being struck, Tehran could declare that it must acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of self-defense, withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accelerate its nuclear endeavors. This would increase pressure on Israel (which has long insisted that it will not be "second" in "possessing" nuclear arms in the Middle East) to confirm its ownership of nuclear weapons publicly, and thus set off a chain of possible nuclear policy reactions in Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh, Algiers, and Ankara."

No Value To Military Threats

To cut to the chase, the prospect that Iran might make nuclear weapons is indeed worrisome, but it is hardly the impending nightmare many from the right, and also the left, make it out to be. In the interest of nuclear nonproliferation, Iran should indeed be discouraged from acquiring them. But threatening military action is hardly the way to do it.

Although the record of U.S. diplomacy with Iran over the program has been dismal, it is still far and away the best option. In the worst case, an Iran with nuclear weapons could still be influenced.

Indeed, the worst thing about Iran’s nuclear program is not Iran itself but how other countries view the outcome. The U.S. security interest lies in strengthening the norms of nuclear nonproliferation. To that end, the United States and other nations could take steps to discourage both Iran and other nations from developing nuclear weapons. These include

- Discrediting the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program as a model for other proliferators through a series of follow-on meetings to the 2005 NPT Review Conference to clarify what activities qualify as being "peaceful."

- Increasing the costs for Iran and its neighbors to leave or infringe the NPT by establishing country-neutral rules against violators withdrawing from the treaty.

- Limiting Iran's freedom to threaten oil and gas shipping by proposing a maritime agreement to demilitarize the Straits of Hormuz.

- Isolate Iran as a regional producer of fissile materials by encouraging Israel to take the first steps to freeze and dismantle such capabilities.

While these measures are not foolproof, they are far better than a military option. They would make it far riskier diplomatically, economically, and militarily for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons than is currently the case.

David Isenberg is a senior research analyst at the British American Security Information Council, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information. The views expressed are his own.