August 31, 2006
New America Foundation Senior Research Fellow Anatol Lieven laments the lack of foreign policy choices afforded to the American public by the two major parties.
That most of the foreign and security strategy of the Bush administration lies in ruins is not open to serious question. In the Middle East, Bush's professions of bringing freedom and democracy have become an insult to the intelligence of the world. The destruction of the Lebanese state by Israel, with US support, comes only months after US leaders wowed to support and defend that country as a beacon of democracy and progress in the Middle East. Bush's remark to President Putin at the G8 about America advocating Iraqi-style democracy for Russia reveals a US leader with approximately the same levels of intelligence and connection to reality as Putin's Soviet predecessor Leonid Brezhnev in his dotage.
The element of Orwellian doublethink in US policy does not relate only to the sickening contrast between the language of democracy and the disasters in Iraq and Lebanon. Even more striking is that this public rhetoric is diametrically opposed to America's actual strategy in the Middle East, unstated publicly but admitted privately by many officials and in any case perfectly obvious.
In recent years, this strategy has reverted to the pre-9/11 norm: The US and Israel are relying on autocracies in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere to hold down their own people, out of fear of US reprisal, Sunni radicalism, Iranian expansionism, or all three. Of course, this is exactly the old strategy which Bush and the neoconservatives insist was proved to be bankrupt by 9/11; and whose proponents have been dismissed by Bush as "racists" because they supposedly "don't believe that Muslims are capable of democracy". You don't get much more Orwellian than this combination.
America's pre-9/11 strategy was based on a commitment to maintain stability in the Middle East - a tenuous and unsatisfactory stability, but relative stability nonetheless. The problem is that this strategy is now combined with US and Israeli strategies which are in effect promoting anarchy. In the case of the latest Israeli attack on Lebanon, this was entirely deliberate. The intention was to put so much pressure on the Lebanese state that the Christians and Druze will launch a new civil war against Hizbollah, thereby "taking Lebanon back 20 years", as an Israeli general boasted.
In the case of the Bush administration, the thinking is much more confused and contradictory. Some leading neo-conservatives and their hangers-on speak openly of the need to cause 'creative destruction' in the Middle East by toppling existing states, but this is certainly not the policy of the administration as it stands. My fear is however that because the administration's existing strategy is so obviously bankrupt, it may sooner or later trap itself into a choice of either admitting that bankruptcy, or conducting what in German is called a flucht nach vorn - an "escape forwards".
In the US case, this would involve an attack on Iran, backing for Israel in an attack on Syria in an effort to topple the Baath regime there, or both. At the time of writing, this is a dilemma that is already facing the Israel government and military, as they face the fact that their offensive against Hizbollah failed, and try to decide whether to admit this fact and rethink their entire strategy, to plough on with existing approaches, or greatly to widen the conflict.
The bankruptcy of US strategy extends far beyond the Middle East. Largely because the Bush administration grossly neglected Afghanistan in order to attack Iran, the situation there is deteriorating, with the Taleban growing in strength. Incredibly, Osama bin Laden and the other planners of 9/11 are still at large on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, and killing or capturing them no longer seems even a second-order interest of the Bush administration.
North Korea's nuclear missile plans have been hindered only by their own technological backwardness, and not in the least by US pressure. The plan to bring Ukraine and other former Soviet countries into NATO has collapsed while infuriating Moscow. All over Central America, also grossly neglected by Washington in recent years, democracies are crumbling or deeply troubled. And more than 2,500 US soldiers are dead in a war in Iraq which was launched on false pretenses and conducted with monstrous incompetence.
In the US public, there is indeed enormous dissatisfaction with what has happened. But most strangely in what is supposed to be a democracy, there is no formal foreign policy opposition in politics. Whatever they may claim, on the great majority of issues, the Democratic establishment stands squarely behind the official line of the Bush administration. A partial exception is the environment, where the Democrats (together with some Republican state governments) are pressing for much more substantial energy-saving measures than those adopted by the administration - though well short of those adopted in most of Europe.
There are two separate public oppositions to the present course of the Bush administration (apart from the neo-cons and the Cheney-Rumsfeld camp, who form a kind of internal opposition within the administration), but they are in opposition to their own party leaderships. The opposition among the Democrats consists of the old Left-liberals, who previously opposed the Vietnam War, and their descendants. They are the forces which last month combined to oust the liberal hawk Senator Joe Lieberman from his position as Democratic Senator for Connecticut, forcing him to run as a pro-Bush independent. The opposition within the Republican Party consists of the old-style moderate conservative realists, whose leading elder statesman is former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and whose leading younger star is Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska.
The lack of real opposition from the mainstream Democrats has been disguised by the growing demands from within the party for early withdrawal from Iraq, represented by Lieberman's defeat; and the counter-attacks on this line both from within the Republican Party and from leading Democrats. This however could turn into something of a mock battle. In the first place, the growing Democrat calls for withdrawal play to public concerns about the chaos and the casualties (US casualties, that is) in Iraq, but the Democrats concerned have absolutely no idea of what strategy to follow in the Middle East after a US withdrawal - or if they do, dare not articulate it publicly in the face of threats from the Israel lobby.
Secondly, on this issue the Democrats over the two years to the next presidential elections may well find themselves pushing on an open door.
The overwhelming consensus among political analysts here is that well before November 2008 the Bush administration will in any case have withdrawn US troops, if not from Iraq altogether, then off the streets and into secure bases in the desert. The Republicans are not fools enough to run in the next elections while the headlines each day report more US deaths in Iraq.
As to the wider issues of US world strategy, the almost identical approach of the two party establishments is easy to demonstrate. One only has to read the speeches and statements of the two figures who at present seem most likely to be the contenders for the Presidency in November 2008, Senators John McCain and Hillary Clinton, and their closest associates.
Both Clinton and McCain advocate early NATO membership for Ukraine, and have expressed strong hostility to the Putin administration in Russia. On Iraq, they differ mostly over the degree to which Clinton - naturally - has been far more critical of the Bush record so far. But both oppose early or unconditional withdrawal. On the latest Middle East crisis their words might as well have been drafted by the same speechwriter. Clinton states that:
"I want us here in New York to imagine, if extremist terrorists were launching rocket attacks across the Mexican or Canadian border, would we stand by or would we defend America against these attacks from extremists?.. We will support [Israel's] efforts to send a message to Hamas, Hezbollah, to the Syrians, to the Iranians... They do not believe in human rights, they do not believe in democracy. They are totalitarians, they are the new totalitarians of the 21st century."
In McCain's words, "What would we do if somebody came across our borders and killed our soldiers and captured our soldiers? Do you think we would be exercising total restraint?.. Israel has neighbors on its borders that are bent on its extinction." Both Clinton and McCain call for negotiations with Iran, but only on condition of Iranian surrender to US wishes, and with the military option as a threat.
On spreading democracy in the Middle East McCain declares that: "The promotion of democracy and freedom is simply inseparable from the long term security of the United States." In Clinton's words, "human freedom and the quest for individuals to achieve their god-given potential must be at the heart of American approaches across the region".
The simplest and most commonly-cited explanation for this Democratic behaviour is domestic electoral calculation, based on the following very curious statistics, from the latest New York Times/CBS poll in July. According to this survey, as of this summer 54 per cent of Americans to 35 per cent disapproved of how Bush is handling foreign policy (and only 20 per cent approve of Bush's grey cardinal, Dick Cheney). Sixty two per cent disapproved of how the administration is handling Iraq.
Yet 51 per cent to 42 per cent continued to approve of how the administration is conducting the war on terror in general - as if there were no connection to Iraq! And this reflects repeated polls showing that while disapproving of the actual Republican record over security, most respondents continue to have more faith in the Republicans when it comes to security. On the crisis in the Middle East, while small majorities hold both Israel and Hizbollah responsible for the conflict and say that it would be better for the US not to take sides, 47 per cent to 27 per cent approved of how George Bush was responding to the conflict, even though he was doing exactly the opposite of what most said they wanted.
If the Democrats were simply reacting cautiously to these curious and contradictory figures by being tough on foreign policy issues, this would be reassuring, because it would suggest that if elected in 2008 they might in fact adopt a strategy very different from their present rhetoric - just as Richard Nixon after 1968 followed completely different strategies towards the Soviet Union, China, and even in the end Vietnam from the ones he had preached in his election campaign.
However, after almost seven years of interacting with intellectuals from the Democratic establishment (above all during my previous job at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, one of the centres of that establishment) I am afraid that while this electoral explanation is not untrue, it is only part of the truth. More important is the fact that if the bulk of the Democrat and Republican establishments speak the same way on foreign policy, it is because they think the same way. And of course the elites do not just react to popular views, they also profoundly shape them.
Firstly, both wings of the bipartisan establishment are American nationalists. They both believe passionately in the founding myths of American civic nationalism: of America as the world's greatest country, the world's greatest democracy, the natural, inevitable and irreplaceable representative of freedom and democracy in the world, and therefore by moral right the world's hegemon.
All this has been repeated again and again in Bush's speeches, but the two most famous expressions of it in recent years were by Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who called the US the "indispensable nation", and declared that "we stand tall, and therefore can see further into the future." These beliefs are drilled into Americans from their first interactions with organized society, whether in pre-school or church, just as similar beliefs about their nation's world role were drilled into European children before 1914. They form an ideological and cultural nexus so strong as to be largely impervious not only to argument but to evidence.
Thus Prospect readers who also read the Financial Times oped pages could read in August liberal hawk Lawrence Kaplan declaring that the greatest threat in the US is not more wars but future isolationism, and leading liberal Jacob Weisberg state that "Iraq was a badly chosen battlefield...in a war with totalitarianism that America has no choice but to pursue." These lines are indistinguishable from those of more moderate neo-conservatives. They are echoed throughout a recent collection of essays by leading Democrat intellectuals entitled With All Our Might, and featuring on the cover an iron-jawed Uncle Sam with an enormous American flag.
Secondly, and as this collection amply demonstrates, the bipartisan establishment is made up of American imperialists. The ideological underpinning of the imperial program stems from the aforementioned nationalist beliefs. Support for it is however immensely strengthened by the class interests of the American policy-making establishment, with its immense professional and individual stakes in America's global power. This power incidentally is not in itself bad. It has played an immensely positive role for humanity at certain points in the past, and could do so again.
At present, however, the US establishment is pursuing an extremely dangerous course. This is above all because, as Clinton's and McCain's statements indicate, the US is present everywhere, and thus impinges on the interests of every other major state in the world; but because of a mixture of overweening arrogance and a breakdown of strategic vision and moral courage in the US establishment, it is incapable of choosing between alternative strategies, establishing priorities, and taking domestically unpopular decisions.
This is true above all of the Middle East and the role of the Israel lobby. The third reason why the Republicans and Democrats sound so alike is that both identify so closely with Israel, whether out of genuine belief or fear of retaliation from the lobby. This was demonstrated by overwhelming of the Senate and House pledging unqualified support for Israel's offensive in Lebanon (410 votes to 8 in the case of the House).
Unfortunately, the power of the lobby, and of the affinity to Israel, has come to have a critical effect on US policy towards Syria, Iran, and indeed the Muslim world in general. Largely as a result, Iranian and Syrian help to the US after 9/11 was ignored in Washington, not only by the Bush administration, but by the media and the establishment in general; and several offers of compromise on wider issues were brushed aside.
If therefore both party establishments are wedded to the basic lines of the present US course, what are the chances of successful domestic revolt against this course? Since the present line is adhered to be the bipartisan establishment, it follows that any revolt against it would have to enjoy massive support from ordinary Americans, and in particular from the most important political constituency and political bellwether, the white middle classes of the "heartland". It would therefore have to appeal to the core traditions of this constituency. In this context, that means a mixture of intense nationalism with deep distrust of foreign entanglements - a mixture dubbed "isolationism" by the imperial elites, though by no means fairly.
The Left faces immense obstacles in appealing to the heartland. Its cosmopolitan traditions and above all its hostility to religion make it culturally very alien to the world of the suburbs and small towns of middle America. It is also wedded to its own version of liberal interventionism. If I have to listen to another American anti-Bush liberal damn the war in Iraq and then advocate US military intervention in Darfur I may eat my beard. This is both intellectual and electoral folly: intellectual, because there are no rational grounds for believing that a US military which has failed so badly in policing one bitterly-divided Muslim society would play a successful role in another.
Electoral, because you cannot successfully appeal to ordinary Americans to reject a war for which at least some justification could be manufactured in terms of defending America, and then ask them to support another war for which there is no argument from national interest at all.
A much more hopeful prospect in the long run lies in a combination between the moderate realists and a populist revolt in the heartland against the costs of empire. Indeed, this would seem to me virtually inevitable sooner or later. As soon as it becomes clearly apparent to the White middle classes that a continuation of present levels of military spending and foreign policy activism requires the abolition of key middle class entitlements - social security, Medicare, mortgage relief and so on - mass pressure for a withdrawal from present levels of engagement will become overwhelming. This will happen all the sooner in the context of an economic recession, or if another war makes the reintroduction of conscription a real possibility.
In the long run, therefore, I have great faith in the ability of a majority of the American people to return to rational and enlightened self-interest. My fear is that for this to happen, the US and the world will have to plunge into even greater disasters, largely caused by the United States itself; and that before America returns to sanity, America's hopelessly obedient and much more vulnerable British vassals will have been attacked a dozen times, and with increasing degrees of savagery.
Anatol Lieven is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington DC. His latest book, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World, co-authored with John Hulsman, is published in September by Pantheon.
This is the original, longer version of an essay which appeared in the September issue of the British magazine Prospect, under the title "Bipartisan Disaster: Americans' growing unease at US foreign policy is not reflected by the two parties." It is reprinted here by permission of the author.
Mind the Gap
August 30, 2006
Writing in the American Prospect Online, Justin Logan, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, observes that Democratic voters have unambiguously repudiated the Bush doctrine. The same can't be said for Democratic foreign policy elites.
The article was published on August 30, 2006, in The American Prospect Online:
Justin Logan is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.
Why Further Withdrawals by Israel Make Most Sense
August 24, 2006
Michael C. Desch of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University explains the logic of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in The Houston Chronicle.
The article was published in The Houston Chronicle and is available in its entirety online:
Michael C. Desch is professor and Robert M. Gates chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.
Anti Iraq War, Pro Terror War
August 22, 2006
Christopher Preble, a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, challenges Joe Lieberman's claim that Ned Lamont's victory is a victory for terrorists.
The article appears at FoxNews.com:
Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. In 2004, he chaired the task force that produced the report Exiting Iraq: Why the U.S. Must End the Occupation and Renew the War against Al Qaeda.
Slam-Dunk Wars Don't Equal Wins
August 21, 2006
Boston University's Andrew Bacevich weighs in on why military victories don't always produce positive long-term results.
The article appears in the Los Angeles Times, Monday, August 21, and is available in its entirety here:
Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. He is the author of several books, including The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.
Iraq or Bust
August 18, 2006
Charles Pena addresses the destructive policies the Pentagon has employed to maintain the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Some believe this is reason to expand the Army, which will provide no short term relief, except for the politicians. Pena suggests a more logical long term solution.
A prominent group of U.S. defense experts, chaired by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and including retired Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General John Shalikashvili, has issued a clarion call that "two-thirds of the Army's operating force, active and reserve, is now reporting as unready." General H. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, has also acknowledged that more than two-thirds of the Army National Guard's 34 brigades are not combat ready. Apparently, the active duty Army claims to be in better shape but is suffering from the same problem. One Army official admits that active duty Army units serving in a war zone are 100 percent combat ready, but not other units. Other data reported to the House Armed Services Committee implies units deployed to Iraq are also in low readiness. According to Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, the primary problem is a funding shortfall resulting in an inability to repair or replace equipment as it is being used up in conflict. Schoomaker's assertion implies that if the equipment problem can be fixed, the U.S. Army can prevail in Iraq. But even if current equipment shortfalls can be remedied (General Schoomaker believes the Army needs more than $17 billion in 2007 and General Blum thinks it could cost as much as $21 billion for the Army National Guard), the real problem in Iraq is not just equipment; it includes manpower and perhaps a bit more.
Earlier this year, military and Pentagon officials hinted that they hoped U.S. troop deployments in Iraq would drop to 100,000 by the end of this year. But now, the plan is to increase troop levels to roughly 135,000 boots on the ground. However, it is not possible to keep 135,000 troops deployed in Iraq (or anywhere else) indefinitely. The ones in Iraq and elsewhere must eventually be relieved by fresh troops, since excessively long or too frequent periods of time away from home creates the risk that soldiers will decide against a military career. For a professional volunteer military force to be able to retain soldiers over time, the rule of thumb for active duty units is a 3:1 rotation ratio (meaning three units are needed to keep one unit fielded). So keeping 135,000 troops in Iraq requires an additional 270,000 for rotation or a total of 405,000 soldiers. This number is precariously close to the total size of the active duty Army, about 500,000 troops. Moreover, the U.S. Army has another 64,000 troops deployed elsewhere overseas that requires a total of 192,000 troops to sustain it. So when you do the math, the Army is about 100,000 soldiers shy of being able to keep up the current deployments. (Of course, if we were fighting a war of national survival -- such as World War II -- troop rotation would not be an issue. We would field as many troops for as long as necessary until victory was achieved. But Iraq and virtually all other U.S. foreign military deployments have nothing to do with national survival.)
Moreover, using the National Guard and Reserves to fill the gap is not the answer. As of the beginning of August, a total of nearly 90,000 members of the Army Reserve and National Guard have been mobilized (that number has been as high as 163,000), and as much as 40 percent of the force in Iraq has consisted of Guard and Reserve. In the past four years, more National Guard and Reserve soldiers have been called to active duty than were cumulatively mobilized since the Cuban Missile Crisis (including for the Vietnam War, the Cuban refugee crisis, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Desert Storm). Plus there is a ripple effect rotation ratio problem for the Reserves and National Guard. Because these are part-time soldiers, the rotation ratio believed to keep them enlisted is between 7:1 and 9:1. Using 8:1 as an average, the current mobilization requires a total force of 720,000 citizen soldiers -- which pretty much accounts for all of the Army Reserve and National Guard force.
The solution applied to the rotation problem caused by Iraq has been twofold. First, deployments have been extended to keep troops in Iraq for longer than normal. Recently, the Defense Department announced that the deployment of the Army's 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team -- more than 3,500 troops -- will continue for as long as an extra four months in an effort to boost security in Baghdad. Second, the Iraq mission has forced the military to resort to the use of "stop-loss" orders to prevent soldiers from leaving the military when their terms of enlistment expire. In November 2003, the Army issued stop-loss orders for the 110,000 soldiers whose units were preparing to go to Iraq and Afghanistan. In January 2004, stop-loss orders were issued covering 160,000 Army soldiers who were returning from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other deployments. And in January 2006, the Army stop-loss program forced 50,000 soldiers into extended duty. But extending deployments and stop-loss are like the little Dutch boy trying to plug all the holes in the dike with his fingers. There are only two real solutions. One is to increase the size of the Army, but this is problematic given that the Army is barely meeting recruiting goals to maintain its current end strength. But even if the Army could be expanded, 135,000 troops in Iraq are not enough.
According to conventional wisdom, the force ratio required for imposing stability and security is 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants, which is what the British -- often acknowledged as the most experienced practitioners of such operations -- deployed for more than a decade in Malaysia and more than 25 years in Northern Ireland. With a population of nearly 25 million people, to meet the same standard in Iraq would require a force of 500,000 troops for perhaps a decade or longer. Paradoxically, however, a large American ground force in Iraq would just make the problem worse -- confirming that the United States is an occupying power and increasing support for the insurgency. Worse yet, a larger military contingent in Iraq removes any shred of doubt from the case made by the radical Islamists that the West is invading Islam, which only encourages the Muslim world (regardless of their sympathies towards al-Qaeda) to unite against the United States. So if military victory in Iraq is a quixotic quest, that leaves the second choice, which is to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq before the Army goes bust.
Charles V. Pena is an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, and a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. He is the author of Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism (Potomac Books, 2006).
This commentary first appeared at the Taylor Marsh political blog at
http://www.taylormarsh.com/ on Aug. 16, 2006, and was distributed by the Straus Military Reform Project.
'Long War' a Tragic Misstep
August 11, 2006
David Isenberg reviews Charles Pena's Winning the Un-War for the Asia Times.
The article is published at Asia Times Online, and is available in its entirety here:
David Isenberg is a senior research analyst at the British American Security Information Council, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, Washington.
The War on Terrorism Five Years after 9/11
August 09, 2006
The Cato Institute will host a discussion of the war on terrorism on Friday, September 8, 2006, beginning at 9:30 am.
Robert Pape, University of Chicago; Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Center; Flynt Leverett, New America Foundation; Dana Priest, Washington Post; Rand Beers, The National Security Network; and Christopher Preble, Cato Institute.
The horrific events of September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the threat posed by suicide terrorism. With the precipitous rise of suicide attacks against democracies, particularly in the five years since 9/11, the time is right to reflect on the rationale and effectiveness of the tactic. Robert Pape, author of the seminal book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, will present the findings of his most recent research, "Suicide Terrorism and Democracy: What We've Learned Since 9/11." Pape's conclusions, that suicide terrorism continues to follow a strategic logic, and that suicide attackers are primarily motivated by resistance to occupation by a foreign power, suggest that important changes should be made in U.S. strategy in the War on Terrorism. Pape's talk will be followed by a panel discussion including some of America's leading experts on terrorism, counter terrorism, and U.S. foreign policy.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
To learn more, and to register, visit the Cato website:
Washington's Masochistic Policy in Iraq
August 08, 2006
Coalition member and Cato Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Ted Galen Carpenter questions the logic behind staying-the-course in Iraq.
The article appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle on Tuesday, August 8, 2006, and is available in its entirety here:
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.
The Left Gets Real
August 07, 2006
Writing in The Nation, Eyal Press explores the unique alliances forged by widespread opposition to the Bush administration's foreign policy.
The article was published in The Nation (August 4, 2006), and is reprinted in its entirety courtesy of Yahoo.com:
August 03, 2006
Christopher Preble, a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Policy, explains that the American public's rising opposition to the Bush Doctrine is a mark of common sense, not isolationism.
The piece is published online, at the Partnership for a Secure America blog:
Christopher Preble is a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and the director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
Bombs Won't Turn Lebanese Hearts
August 01, 2006
Ted Galen Carpenter compares the strategy employed by the Israelis in Lebanon with the strategy prominent neocons have urged the Bush administration to use against Iran. Just as the Israeli campaign has failed to achieve its objective, so too is this strategy likely to fail in Iran.
The article was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer, August 1, 2006, and is available in its entirety online:
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.